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ASSAULT UPON SOLITUDE-A REMEDY?
Privacy is an exciting legal concept which is often subject to
national controversy. A recent multitude of books,' articles,2 and
studies' describe the alarming specter of computerized collection and
storage of personal information as yet another, albeit sophisticated,
"invasion of privacy." However disquieting this "Big Brother"
development may appear, personal data banks are at least an argu-
ably foreseeable, and in most cases beneficial, result of the computer
age. At least this transgression of privacy is passive. By contrast,
this comment will explore a neglected but no less important threat to
privacy, the interest of maintaining control over the physical se-
clusion, tranquillity, and solitude of the private residence. Privacy
in this sense is the householder's control over desired or unwanted
communications with outsiders in a limited, private property en-
vironment.4
Mail is one of the three methods by which outsiders can intrude
into the home; but, because of mail's intrinsically passive nature, it
can be readily ignored and will not be discussed herein.' However,
physical and sonic intrusions, primarily caused by unwanted door-
to-door and telephone solicitations, result in unavoidable distur-
bances. This interference on the "home front" can effectively destroy
the individual's solitude, a quality of life which is an absolutely
necessary, as well as highly desirable, human experience.'
Most states provide stiff criminal sanctions against telephone
harassment and eavesdropping.7 However, no parallel remedy is
presently available for the incessant daily interruptions by chari-
table8 and commercial solicitors,' front porch missionaries,'0 and
pollsters.
1 See, e.g., J. ROSENBERG, THE DEATH OF PRIVACY (1969); A. WESTIN, PRIVACY
AND FREEDOM (1967) [hereinafter cited as WESTIN].
2 See, e.g., NEWSWEEK, July 27, 1970, at 15.
3 See, e.g., THE PROBLEMS Or PRIVACY IN THE COMPUTER AGE (A. HARRISON ed.
1967).
4 For an interesting philosophical examination of privacy, see Fried, Privacy, 77
YALE L. J. 475 (1968).
5 For an analysis of the problem posed by hate mail, see Ezer, Intrusion of
Solitude: Herein of Civil Rights and Civil Wrongs, 21 LAW IN TRANS. 63, 67-75
(1961).
6 See note 16, infra.
7 See CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 630-637.2, 653m (West 1970). For a complete summary
of currently enacted legislation dealing with telephone abuse, see Note, Unwanted
Telephone Calls-A Legal Remedy?, 1967 UTAH L. REV. 379, 404-407.
8 A sizable portion of charitable contributions are solicited in the home. Charities
raised $9.2 billion in 1962. M. BRENTON, THE PRIVACY INVADERS 199 (1964) [herein-
after cited as BRENTON].
9 One encyclopedia publisher alone employs over 80,000 door-to-door solicitors.
BUSINESS WEEK, July 29, 1967, at 57.
10 The Jehovah's Witnesses is one such missionary sect. This group made in ex-
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Although public policy may soon demand protection of domes-
tic solitude because of increasing intrusions on the home, the fol-
lowing discussion will reveal that no tort theory or constitutional
scheme yields a feasible defense. However, a carefully constructed
ordinance enacted and enforced by the local government authority
is one means by which an effective protection against the growing
challenge to domestic solitude can be realized."
Hopefully, this comment will afford adequate guidance to indi-
viduals and communities that have decided that the time to act is
at hand.
PRIVACY-A HUMANISTIC CONCEPT IN NEED OF PROTECTION
The vigorous arguments of innumerable commentators and dis-
satisfied plaintiffs are, as of yet, insufficient to expand any existing
theory of privacy to adequately afford protection from unwanted
household intrusions. Nevertheless, the pressing social need for pro-
tection of the home environment is cause for grave concern. Before
analyzing this need, a short examination of the "right to privacy"
concept is warranted.
The legal right to privacy has been exhaustively discussed,
analyzed, and criticized during its short life span." If anything is
absolute with respect to this "most comprehensive right," it is that
confusion permeates all of its theories. Few concepts are more vague,
or less amenable to definition or application. 3 This difficulty stems
from two dichotomous concepts of privacy, one tort or "private
law" theory, and the other constitutional or "public law" in nature.
Difficulties arise when determining which theory, if either, is ap-
plicable in a given circumstance. More often there are congeries
of interest, some interrelated, some unrelated, and some clearly in-
consistent. 4
Despite-perhaps even because of-the problems of articulat-
cess of 29.5 million visits to homes in the United States during the twelve months
ending September 30, 1969. 1970 YEARBOox OF JEHOVAH'S WITNESSEs 27 (1969).
11 In areas where communities are more or less contiguous, regional or state
wide legislation may be required to achieve the desired local result.
12 "[N]o other tort has received such-an outpouring of comment in advocacy
of its bare existence." W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 830 (3rd ed. 1964).
13 Dixon, The Griswold Penumbra: Constitutional Charter for an Expanded
Law of Privacy, 64 MIcH. L. REV. 197 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Dixon].
14 Id. at 199. Authors, attorneys, and jurists alike have found it difficult and
sometimes impossible to compartmentalize privacy into mutually exclusive concepts
in which tort law and constitutional protection operate independently. This result is
not surprising considering the source of the two privacy concepts. Brandeis, a co-
author of the tort concept, was later to propound the constitutional theory from the
bench of the Supreme Court. See note 25, infra.
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ing a precise definition of privacy and the inherent limitations of any
tort concept, vast segments of society value privacy as the most
cherished "right" of civilized man. For many privacy is a major
component of the "American Dream."'" Complementing this socio-
political phenomenon is a conclusively demonstrated psychological
human need for privacy in the form of seclusion and solitude.' 6 In-
dividuals must be afforded occasional opportunities to shed their
highly developed psychic armor which protects the human spirit
from the pressures of modern society. Being always "on stage"
would destroy the human organism. 7
The American political and social systems indirectly encourage
a recluse by maintaining strong commitments to the family, a social
unit which can adequately provide physical and mental solitude.18
A complementary and historically stronger Anglo-Saxon commit-
ment has been the preservation of the home.' Today the main-
stream of lay sentiment clearly expects protection of domestic
solitude under the law. However incorrect the statement may be as
a legal conclusion, a common spontaneous reaction to unwanted in-
trusions is: "They're invading my privacy!"
The most difficult legalistic hurdle along the path to a remedy
is recognizing that privacy is more akin to a spiritual interest than
any interrelationship of property and people. ° This viewpoint leads
many commentators to disregard privacy as a legal concept worthy
of protection. For example, the late Dean Magruder suggested that
the mental hide be toughened rather than develop a legal remedy for
irritations incident to modern society.2 The opposite, more human-
istic, viewpoint contends that an increasing callousness and toler-
ance of intrusions on solitude is cause for serious concern. This
15 Dixon, supra note 13.
16 The physical and psychological tensions incident to life in modern society de-
mand periods of privacy for emotional release, reflection, and rejuvenation. Studies
have also linked a human need for autonomy with the concept of individuality, a
keystone upon which all democratic political systems rest. WESTINl, supra note 1, at
32-37. See generally, K. HoRvY, OUR INNER CONFLICTS 73 (1945); A. MASLOW,
MOTIVATION AND PERSONALITY 212-213, 227, 237 (1954); H. MURRAY, EXPLORATIONS
IN PERSONALITY 144-145, 151, 156-158 (1938).
17 WsTIN, supra note 1, at 35. Studies of other mammals have revealed a simi-
lar requirement for temporary seclusion between normal "social" encounters. Id. at 10.
18 Id. at 24.
19 "The poorest man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to all the forces of the
Crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; the
storms may enter; the rains may enter; but the King of England may not enter; all
his force dares not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement." William Pitt, 1776,
as quoted in BRENTON, supra note 8 at 237.
20 Recall that in simplistic terms traditional law concepts deal with the inter-
relationships of people to property, property to property, and people to people.
21 Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbances in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV.
L. REV. 1033, 1035 (1936).
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concern is founded on a belief that future deterioration of individ-
uality and the opportunity for solitude will cause harmful, if not
disastrous, effects on the American way of life. Population growth
and complex societal interdependence will accentuate this problem.
Similarly, this growth and commutuality are precisely why privacy
should be zealously safeguarded.22 If left unchecked, the erosion of
domestic solitude will inevitably destroy a critical element of in-
dividuality. 3
Unfortunately, the natural growth of societal complexity is not
likely to foster a suitably protective concept of privacy.24 While a
growing judicial awareness of an expanding civil right to privacy
from governmental intrusions is apparent, no parallel legal concept
is developing to counter non-governmental interests. 25 A crucial
question to be answered herein is whether such protection can be
found in the law, and if not, whether a reasonably effective defense
can be legislated. A logical starting point in the search for a remedy
is a brief examination of tort law.
TORT LAW LIMITATIONS
The first legal barricades for protection against unwanted in-
trusions of the home were structured from two tort concepts, inva-
sion of privacy and nuisance. Although neither concept has proven
to be, by itself, a satisfactory remedy, a brief analysis of these con-
cepts reveals how a protective device should be structured.
22 BRENTON, supra note 8, at 13. This comment endorses Mr. Brenton's thesis
that the encroachments on privacy ". . . are fast becoming unreasonable and irrespon-
sible full-scale invasions, denigrating our privacy to an alarming degree and tending
to make intrusions a way of everyday life." Id.
23 See WsTrN, supra note 1, at 368.
24 In addition to population growth in absolute terms, massive population
migration to urban areas has accentuated our "beehive-like" life style. At the same
time technological sophistication presents some difficult challenges to solitude, includ-
ing randomly dialed, computerized telephone solicitations and personal information
data banks.
25 Thirty-seven years after co-authoring the "birth" of the tort privacy concept,
Mr. Justice Brandeis announced his now famous advocacy of privacy from govern-
mental intrusion. "The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions
favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's
spiritual nature, of his feelings and his intellect. They knew that only a part of the
pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They sought
to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensa-
tions. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone-the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized man." Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1927) (dissenting). See Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965). But see Rogers, A New Era for Privacy, 43 N.D. L. REV. 253,
269 (1967), where the author observes: "For all these years the Court has mouthed
platitudes about man's home being his castle. Yet all the Court has been willing to
protect is the castle door."
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Invasion of Privacy
The tort concept of privacy grew out of a now famous law
review article which was written by Samuel Warren and Louis
Brandeis in protest of the "yellow press" of Boston." Although they
failed to specifically articulate a right to domestic solitude, they did
mention personal solitude as part of the privacy concept warranting
protection. A right to solitude had been first announced two years
earlier.27
No precise definition of this tort exists even today. However,
the conceptual thrust of modern privacy tort law is towards the
protection of man's sensations, emotions, and spiritual nature. This
theory is in contrast with most traditional tort theories which pro-
vide protection of physical persons and tangible property.
Dean Prosser has categorized the right to be let alone as one
of four distinct areas included in the invasion of privacy tort.2"
However, to obtain damages for interference with this right, the
intrusion must be something which is decisively offensive or ob-
jectionable to a reasonable man.29 Case law indicates that "run of
the mill" intrusions by door-to-door or telephone solicitors are
annoyances that must be endured ad nauseam.30
In contrast, plaintiffs who seek damages against those using
listening devices to invade their privacy have generally been suc-
cessful." However, absent this furtive technique of spying, tradi-
tional tort remedies have been almost uniformly frustrated. No
matter how personally humiliating or irritating the intrusion may
seem to the victim, courts unanimously refuse to extend the scope
of protection without the demonstration of an overwhelming quan-
tum of malicious harassment.
32
26 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
27 T. COOLEY, LAW OF TORTS 29 (2nd ed. 1888).
28 Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960). Dean Prosser identifies four
separate torts under the general heading of privacy: 1). intrusion upon the plaintiff's
seclusion or solitude, or his private affairs; 2). public disclosures of embarrassing facts
about the plaintiff; 3). publicity which places the plaintiff in a "false light" in the
public eye; and 4). appropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of the plaintiff's
name or likeness. Id. at 389. However, this categorization has not gone without
severe criticism. Cf. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer
to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 962, 1000-1007 (1964). For a review of the right
of privacy tort concepts that are recognized in California, see Comment, The Right
oj Privacy in California, 7 SANTA CLARA LAW. 242 (1967).
29 W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 833 (3rd ed. 1964).
30 The scant number of reported cases in this area probably indicates that few
plaintiffs can afford time consuming, expensive litigation with the hope of receiving
minimal damages at best.
31 See, e.g., Roach v. Harper, 143 W.Va. 869, 105 S.E.2d 564 (1958).
32 See notes 33 & 34 and accompanying text, infra.
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Typical of the decisions which allow relief is Housh v. Peth.3
In that case the Ohio Supreme Court held that a continuous barrage
of telephone calls directed at the plaintiff was so outrageously un-
reasonable and malicious that damages were appropriate. Plaintiff
was awarded $2000. However, plaintiffs in a qualitatively similar
legal position, but not experiencing the "required" quantum of
harassment, are not likely to succeed.84
Clearly the invasion of privacy tort does not provide an effec-
tive remedy for unwanted intrusions in everyday life. An obvious
alternative is the tort of nuisance.
Nuisance
All jurisdictions within the United States have enacted broad
criminal statutes concerning nuisances;35 and public nuisance ac-
tions are tried by the state. The victims of such nuisances are
spared most of the expensive and time consuming burden of litiga-
tion and therefore, should be less inhibited from bringing complaints
against alleged offenders. However, few prosecutions of solicitors
under a nuisance theory have proved successful. 6 The activity must
be conclusively offensive, inconvenient, or annoying to the average
person in the community. 7 The reasonableness, the duration or re-
occurrence, and the severity of the alleged nuisance are determina-
tive factors for finding a fact situation which will result in a
successful prosecution.88 Both public and private nuisance actions
require some substantial interference with the interest involved; the
law does not concern itself with all of the annoyances and distur-
bances of everyday life. 9
A solid line of decisions precludes protection of domestic
solitude by means of the nuisance theory without carefully drafted
legislation. For example, unwanted door-to-door visitations by mis-
sionaries are not actionable nuisances." Although in the social sense
a householder might find having to answer the doorbell in response
to unwanted solicitations of products or ideas a nuisance, this is not
a nuisance in the legal sense.4
83 165 Ohio St. 35, 133 N.E.2d 340 (1956).
84 See generally, Tollefson v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 142 Colo. 442, 351 P.2d 274(1960) ; Household Finance Corp. v. Bridge, 252 Md. 531, 250 A.2d 878 (1969) ; Nader
v. General Motors Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 560, 255 N.E.2d 765 (1970); Lewis v. Physicians
and Dentists Credit Bureau, 27 Wash. 2d 267, 177 P.2d 896 (1947).
35 W. PROssER, THE LAW OF TORTS, 607 (3rd ed. 1964).
86 See, e.g., People v. Northum, 41 Cal. App. 2d 284, 106 P.2d 433 (1940).
87 W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS, 599 (3rd ed. 1964).
8 Id. at 599-602.
39 Id. at 598-99.
40 See People v. Northum, 41 Cal. App. 2d 284, 106 P.2d 433 (1940).
41 Id. at 289, 106 P.2d at 436.
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In actions brought under a private nuisance theory, an actual
interference with the use and enjoyment of the land must be shown.
Without such proof, the interference with some personal right is
insufficient for obtaining a judgment.42 However, at least two cases
involving extended telephone harassment have resulted in private
nuisance judgments.43 Nevertheless, absent any malice or harass-
ment, the nuisance theory will offer no protection to the individual
seeking guarantees of domestic solitude.
A seemingly reasonable administrative solution to telephone
intrusions has recently been proposed by an enterprising law stu-
dent.44 In his petition to the California Public Utilities Commission,
he requested that the local telephone authority be directed to place
an asterisk (*) beside the telephone listing of anyone making such
a request. The asterisk, accompanied by suitable warnings placed in
the telephone directory, would inform telephone solicitors that the
party so indicated does not desire commercial, charitable, polling, or
religious solicitations of any kind. In dismissing this suggestion, the
California Public Utilities Commission held that telephone regula-
tion of this nature is the business of the legislature.45
Realizing that there is no civil right to privacy from non-gov-
ernmental agents and that no common law concept will protect
solitude adequately, a statutory solution must be found. Threat of
a trespass violation is presently impossible in California as residen-
tial property cannot legally be posted.46 However, many states and
municipalities have trespass-after-warning statutes, and appellate
courts will uphold a conviction when the statute has constitutionally
classified which activities are prohibited. A typical case is Village of
West Jefferson v. Robinson,4 7 in which the Ohio Supreme Court held
that an ordinance which prohibited uninvited commercial door-to-
door solicitation was a valid exercise of the police power. The ordi-
nance defined such activities as a public nuisance and provided a
misdemeanor conviction for violators.4" Statutory "warning" such
as given in the West Jefferson case is sufficient when the legislative
intent and effect is to prohibit only commercial intrusions. 9 How-
42 W. PROSsE , THE LAw OF ToRTS, 611 & n.91 (3rd ed. 1964).
43 Brillhardt v. Ben Tripp, Inc., 48 Wash. 2d 722, 297 P.2d 232 (1956) ; Wiggins
v. Moskins Credit Clothing Store, 137 F. Supp. 764 (ED. S.C. 1956).
44 This interesting but economically infeasible solution is discussed in detail
within the opinion of McDaniel v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 60 P.U.R.3d 47 (Cal.
Pub. Util. Comm'n 1965).
45 Id. at 50.
46 See CAL. PEN. CODE § 554 (West 1970).
47 1 Ohio St. 2d 113, 205 N.E.2d 382 (1965).
48 Id. at 115, 205 N.E.2d at 384.
49 In 1942 the Supreme Court made its first decision bearing directly upon a
community's right to regulate commercial solicitation. The Court upheld a city ordi-
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ever, when first amendment considerations are present, severe lim-
itations are placed upon state legislative action.50
THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE
That segment of the American public which regards unwanted
intrusions into the home to be unlawful, generally rests its argument
on some ethereal constitutional scheme. However, the Federal Con-
stitution protects citizens only from certain governmental intrusions
on privacy.5' Therefore, the scope of constitutional considerations
herein will be necessarily limited to passing on the validity of legis-
lation designed to regulate intrusions by non-governmental sources.
The so called Green River ordinance was first constitutionally
tested in 1933.52 That ordinance was primarily aimed at prohibiting
itinerant merchants from making uninvited door-to-door solicita-
tions. In Town of Green River v. Fuller Brush Co.,5" the defendant
argued that the ordinance was an unreasonable and discriminatory
burden on interstate commerce which denied him a property right
without due process of law. The court disagreed and upheld the
ordinance as a valid exercise of the community's police power, rea-
soning that the ordinance regulated only the location and method by
which commerce could be transacted. 4 Ever since the Town of
Green River decision, similar legislation has been challenged in
both state and federal courts on grounds of violation of the inter-
state commerce clause, the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment, and the first admendment guarantees of free speech
and press.55
nance which prohibited the distribution of commercial advertising in the streets and
announced that the Constitution clearly imposes no restraint on reasonable govern-
mental regulation of commerce. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
50 See note 62 and accompanying text, infra.
51 Simplistically speaking, the Constitution grants certain powers to the states
and the federal government while at the same time imposing restraints on both to
protect individual freedoms. The Constitution does not expressly restrain non-govern-
mental interests. See J. BURNS, GOVERNMENT BY THE PEOPLE 83-85 (5th ed. 1963).
52 Town of Green River v. Fuller Brush Co., 65 F.2d 112 (10th Cir. 1933).
"Green River" is a label traditionally used in referring to antisolicitation ordinances.
See text accompanying note 53, infra. Protection of privacy, crime prevention, and
avoidance of generally agreed upon annoyances have been frequently offered by local
governments as reasons for enacting antisolicitation legislation.
53 65 F.2d 112 (10th Cir. 1933).
54 Id. at 115. "The act of strangers in going upon private property uninvited
and ringing doorbells is not in our judgment a property right." Id. at 116.
55 See, e.g., Donley v. City of Colorado Springs, 40 F. Supp. 15 (D. Colo.
1941); Zimmerman v. Village of London, 38 F. Supp. 582 (S.D. Ohio 1941); McCor-
mick v. City of Montrose, 105 Colo. 493, 99 P.2d 969 (1939); Jewel Tea Co. v. City
of Geneva, 137 Neb. 768, 291 N.W. 664 (1940); Green v. Town of Gallup, 46 N.M.
71, 120 P.2d 619 (1941); People v. Bohnke, 287 N.Y. 154, 38 N.E.2d 478 (1941);
City of Orangeburg v. Farmer, 181 S.C. 143, 186 S.E. 783 (1936).
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The landmark case of Breard v. City of Alexandria,56 estab-
lished the present guidelines for the construction of antisolicitation
statutes. Defendant Breard was arrested for going from house to
house obtaining subscriptions to nationally known magazines in vio-
lation of the city's antisolicitation ordinance." He unsuccessfully
argued that the ordinance in question violated the interstate com-
merce clause and his rights under the first and fourteenth amend-
ments. The Court5" determined that the constitutionality of the
ordinance turned upon a balancing of conveniences: the house-
holder's desire for privacy and the publisher's right to distribute his
information in a certain way. In upholding the validity of the ordi-
nance, the Court emphasized the inherent limitations of a solicitor's
property right rather than strongly advocating any right to privacy
in the home.59
Whereas certain species of commercial activities can be regu-
lated to the point of extinction,6" the Supreme Court has an-
nounced that similarly stringent regulation of religious and political
activities is unconstitutional. Likewise, charities have been afforded
constitutional protection."' The landmark case in this area is Martin
v. City of Struthers,2 in which the defendant was arrested while
going from door-to-door distributing religious handbills. The City
argued that the defendant was not prohibited from distributing her
56 341 U.s. 622 (1951). The Court took notice that up to this time in only
five instances had similar ordinances withstood appellate review. Id. at 628 n.6.
57 A portion of the ordinance follows. "Section 1. Be it Ordained by the Council
of the City of Alexandria, Louisiana, in legal session convened that the practice of
going in and upon the private residences in the City of Alexandria, Louisiana by
solicitors, peddlers, hawkers, itinerant merchants or transient vendors of merchandise
not having been requested or invited so to do by the owner or owners, occupant or
occupants of said private residences for the purpose of soliciting orders for the sale
of goods, wares and merchandise and/or disposing of and/or peddling or hawking the
same is declared to be a nuisance and punishable as such nuisance as a misdemeanor."
Id. at 624-625.
58 Justice Reed, author of the vigorous dissent in the Martin case, note 61
infra, gave the opinion of the Court. (5-4 decision).
50 "[Tihe exigencies of trade are not ordinarily expected to have a higher rating
constitutionally than the tranquillity of the fireside. . . ." Breard v. City of Alexandria,
341 U.S. 622, 627 (1951). The Court also reasoned that to force a community to
admit the solicitors of publications into the home would be a gross misapplication
of the first and fourteenth amendment guarantees. Id. at 645.
60 See note 49, supra.
61 Adams v. City of Park Ridge, 293 F.2d 585 (7th Cir. 1961). The Chicago
Heart Fund successfully challenged an ordinance which required city council approval
of all solicitations by charitable organizations except for the Community Chest.
Although the ordinance was a clear denial of equal protection, the court rested its
decision primarily on the denial of first amendment guarantees. Although not clearly
articulated by the court, at least some charitable organizations may have an infor-
mational as well as a collecting function in society. This educational aspect of charities
is constitutionally protected. See 75 HAgv. L. REv. 1649 (1962).
62 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
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literature, but only from summoning the householder to his door. 8
However, the Court's 5-4 decision regarded the ordinance as anal-
ogous to a trespass-without-warning statute which violated first
amendment rights of both the defendant and the potential recipient
of her literature.64 The Court's decision turned on its belief that
every citizen has the right to decide whether or not to listen or
otherwise receive information in his home.65 The Struthers ordi-
nance clearly denied this right.66
In comparison, courts have experienced a more difficult task
in accommodating those who exercise their freedom of expression in
a public place, when such activity seriously affects the peace and
tranquillity of neighboring homes. The typical fact situation involves
the use of sound amplification equipment located on streets or park-
ing lots but heard, either by design or unavoidably, in private resi-
dences.67 Although the courts have not uniformly upheld ordinances
which regulate disturbances of this nature, courts will usually allow
reasonable restraint of this type of "aural aggression."6"
The California Constitution grants adequate power to its sub-
ordinate county and municipal governments to safeguard the tran-
quillity of the home.69 Consequently, California ordinances which
regulate various types of commercial solicitation have been uni-
formly upheld.70 In the recent case of Di Lorenzo v. City of Pacific
68 "It is unlawful for any person distributing handbills, circulars or other adver-
tisements to ring the door bell, sound the door knocker, or otherwise summon the
inmate or inmates of any residence to the door for the purpose of receiving such
handbills, circulars or other advertisements they or any person with them may be
distributing." Id. at 142.
64 Id. at 148. By comparison, no unconstitutionality is found when no state
action is present. See Watchtower Bible & Tract Society v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
297 N.Y. 339, 79 N.E.2d 433 (1948), cert. denied 335 U.S. 886 (1948).
65 The Court has frequently reiterated its holding that the first amendment
protects an individual's right to receive information of his choosing. See Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (obscene material); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (birth control information) ; Lamont v. Postmaster General,
381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (political literature) (Brennan, J., concurring).
66 The Martin case disapproved a holding made one year and one justice change
earlier which declared a considerably more restrictive ordinance valid. Cf. Jones v.
Opelika, 316 U.S. 584 (1942), rev'd, 319 U.S. 103 (1943).
67 See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (ordinance upheld); Saia v. New
York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948) (ordinance held invalid); Haggerty v. Associated Farmers
of California, 44 Cal. 2d 60, 279 P.2d 734 (1955) (ordinance upheld).
68 Id.
69 Despite sharp curtailment of the police power in many areas by the state
government, local government has not been pre-empted in the solicitation area.
See generally, D. MANDELKER, MANAGING OUR URBAN ENVIRONMENT. 171-172 (1966).
"Any county, city, town, or township may make and enforce within its limits all
such local, police, sanitary and other regulations as are not in conflict with general
laws." CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 11.
70 See, e.g., People v. Mobin, 237 Cal. App. 2d 115, 46 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1965);
Pittsford v. City of Los Angeles, 50 Cal. App. 2d 25, 122 P.2d 535 (1942); In re
Hartmann, 25 Cal. App. 2d 55, 76 P.2d 709 (1938).
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Grove,71 an ordinance which prohibited solicitation for profit or the
placement of information on private property without the consent
of the owner or occupant, withstood constitutional challenge. Agree-
ing with the plaintiff that the Martin case was controlling, the court
held that limited regulation of the time, place, and manner of distri-
bution of literature is valid and constitutional if the peace, good
order, and comfort of the community require it.72 Exacting atten-
tion should be given to this uncharted area of limited regulation
when constructing truly effective and comprehensive antisolicitation
legislation.
LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS
Pragmatically speaking, the problem of enacting effective legis-
lation centers more on political realities than constitutional consid-
erations. Antisolicitation ordinances are by their very nature highly
controversial and exceedingly unpopular with certain factions of the
community.7" The twenty-eight day life span of one such antisolicita-
tion ordinance suggests that adoption of effective measures to pro-
tect residential solitude will be made only through compromise and
the insistence of an intensely persistent body politic.
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Telephone Solicitation
The inability of the individual to give telephone solicitors no-
tice that he does not want to be disturbed, necessitates a different
legislative solution than the door-to-door situation.75 The Supreme
Court has held on numerous occasions that it is within the police
power to reasonably regulate business and commerce where they
conflict with the health, comfort, and convenience of the com-
munity. Outright prohibition of business and commercial telephone
solicitations will be constitutionally valid as long as some other rea-
71 260 Cal. App. 2d 68, 67 Cal. Rptr. 3 (1968).
72 Id. at 74, 67 Cal. Rptr. at 7. See also, Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S.
141, 143 (1943).
78 Strong opposition to antisolicitation regulation has traditionally come from
telephone companies, polling organizations and insurance companies. See generally,
McDaniel v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 60 P.U.R.3d 47, 49 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n
1969).
74 Tampa, Florida's telephone anti-solicitation ordinance (3612-A) was passed
on September 22, 1964 and repealed on October 20, 1964.
75 Perhaps the most prominent reason why notice beside telephone listings was
rejected in McDaniel was the extreme cost of implementing the plan. McDaniel v.
Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 60 P.U.R.3d 47, 55 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1965).
76 However, control of activities which are constitutionally subject to regulation
may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thus invade
areas of protected freedom. See Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 250 (1967); NAACP
v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964).
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sonable means of pursuing the commercial enterprise is available. 77
One such ordinance has already withstood constitutional challenge.78
However, where the desire for domestic solitude interferes with
first amendment rights, accommodation must result. 79 The Martin
case held that the peace, good order, and comfort of the community
may require some degree of regulation of the time, place, and man-
ner of exercising those rights."0 Therefore, while some regulation is
constitutionally valid, reasonable access to householders must be
guaranteed to those who desire to express themselves by means of
the telephone. The author's proposed telephone ordinance allows for
such accommodation.
PROPOSED TELEPHONE SOLICITATION ORDINANCE
a). The use of any telephone in the City of -81 by any solicitor,
peddler, promoter, vendor, or any other person for the purpose of
contacting another person in the City to offer for sale or sell prod-
ucts or services, or to promote by any scheme, device, or other
means, any commercial or business plan, project, or venture, with-
out having been requested or invited so to do by the person called,
or without the present existence of a current business or commer-
cial relationship between the person called and the person making
such a call, is hereby declared to be a nuisance and punishable
as a misdemeanor.8 2
b). Furthermore, the use of any telephone in the City by any
solicitor, promoter, pollster, missionary, campaigner, or any other
person for the purpose of contacting another person in the City
concerning solicitations or information about any charity, opinion,
religion, political belief, or non-profit organization, without having
been requested so to do by the person called is hereby declared
to be a nuisance and punishable as a misdemeanor.83 The provi-
sions of this subsection (b) do not apply to any calls concerning
solicitations or information about any charity, opinion, religion,
77 See Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 632-33 (1951); Valentine v.
Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942).78 See Alabama Law Enforcement Officers v. City of Anniston, 272 Ala. 319, 131
So. 2d 897 (1961).
79 "Freedom to distribute information to every citizen wherever he desires to
receive it is so clearly vital to the preservation of a free society that, putting aside
reasonable police and health regulations of time and manner of distribution, it must
be fully preserved." Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146-47 (1943). "The
right of freedom of speech and press includes not only the right to utter or to print,but the right to distribute, the right to receive ... " Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 482 (1965).
80 Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943). Accord, Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1939).
81 In areas where communities are more or less contiguous, regional or statewide
legislation may be required to achieve any measure of success.
82 Depending upon the existing legislation within the jurisdiction, provisions for
penalties may have to be set forth within the ordinance.
83 Id.
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political belief or non-profit organization placed between the hours
of 9:00 A.M. and 7:00 P.M., Sundays excepted.
As is readily apparent, the proposed ordinance classifies tele-
phone "solicitations" into two broad categories: commercial and
non-commercial. This division is necessitated by both constitutional
and political considerations. Perhaps the most important are the
latter. Unless the ordinance insures a workable compromise between
the individual's desire to be left alone and those interests that will
be regulated, the ordinance is not likely to be enacted.
The proposed ordinance prohibits all commercial solicitations
unless they have been requested or a current business relationship
exists between the caller and the recipient of the call. Practically
speaking, few established merchants use a solicitation marketing
technique and those that do have a myriad of alternative advertis-
ing and sales methods at their disposal. The clause allowing calls by
current business associates will allow creditors and their agents to
remind clientele of their obligations without fear of prosecution.
This exception clause is clearly justifiable. The individual has at
some previous time chosen to initiate business relations with the
caller, and in many cases has been extended credit. In a sense, prior
conduct of the individual has impliedly authorized telephone com-
munications to maintain, clarify, or arbitrate existing relations.
The absolute prohibition of all other commercial telephone
solicitation is constitutionally valid. In both Valentine v. Chresten-
sen8 4 and Breard v. City of Alexandria, 5 the Supreme Court an-
nounced that certain forms of commercial solicitation could be
prohibited by a municipality if such action was deemed necessary.
In the Valentine case, the owner of a submarine on display was
arrested for violating a city ordinance which prohibited the distri-
bution of commercial handbills in the streets. Although a second
printing of the handbills contained a protest of the ordinance on
the reverse side, the Supreme Court held that this addition to the
circular did not warrant the extension of first amendment pro-
tection to the defendant's distribution. The defendant's motive was
still commercial in nature and thereby was not afforded constitu-
tional protection. Likewise in Breard, commercial door-to-door so-
licitation was prohibited. Clearly, the denial of the telephone for
commercial solicitation stands on identical constitutional ground.
As discussed earlier, accommodation of solicitors is constitu-
tionally required when first amendment rights are concerned. As was
so clearly stated in the Martin case, both the solicitor and the po-
84 316 U.S. 52, 54-55 (1942).
85 341 U.S. 622, 632-33 (1951).
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tential recipient have a right to disseminate and receive informa-
tion." However, the Martin case likewise holds that the time,
manner, and place of information dissemination can be regulated."
Thus, while no reported case has verified the constitutionality of
an ordinance limiting the hours in which solicitation can be made,
the constitutional question is narrowed considerably. Do the time
limitations included in the ordinance constitute reasonable regula-
tion?
The proposed ordinance provides sixty hours each week in
which non-commercial solicitations or informational calls can be
placed. Assuming that eight hours of each day are spent sleeping,
over one-half of the remaining waking hours are available for the
exercise of first amendment rights by telephone. Thus, a strong
argument can be made that the limitations included in the proposed
ordinance are reasonable and therefore constitutionally valid.
Opinion surveys and non-profit organizations serve valuable
functions in society. Although some individuals may find solicita-
tions by these institutions the most aggravating of all, constitutional
considerations would in some instances preclude absolute prohibi-
tion. For example, an atheist society would certainly have a con-
stitutional right to distribute information. Consequently, to avoid
any constitutional problem under either the first amendment free
speech guarantee or the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment, these institutions' solicitation capability has been pro-
tected.
Thus, the proposed telephone ordinance has been constructed
not only to satisfy constitutional requirements, but to facilitate a
workable accommodation with important civic interests. This com-
promise will help in obtaining passage of the ordinance and result
in a reasonable degree of domestic solitude not previously experi-
enced.
Door-to-Door Solicitation
An ordinance to regulate door-to-door solicitations is simple in
comparison to the telephone problem. The notice requirement is
easily satisfied. Likewise, no difficulty with communications across
local jurisdictional limits has to be dealt with. Conveniently, the
Supreme Court has come close to suggesting how to construct an
effective and constitutionally valid ordinance. In the Martin case
the Court referred to a proposed regulation which would make it
88 Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146-47 (1943).
87 Id. at 143.
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an offense to summon a householder who has appropriately indicated
that this was against his wishes. 8  In a subsequent case, the Court
inferred that an appropriate sign coupled with valid legislation
would adequately protect the householder."9 Therefore, the decision
as to whether a physical intrusion into the home will be allowed
can be left with whom it belongs-with the individual householder.
PROPOSED DOOR-To-DooR SOLICITATION ORDINANCE
a). The practice of going in or on a private residence in the City
of -, and ringing the doorbell or otherwise summoning the inmate
of that residence, by solicitors, peddlers, pollsters, missionaries,
campaigners, distributors, or any other person for the purpose of
offering for sale or selling products or services, or to promote by
any plan, scheme, device, or other means any commercial or busi-
ness enterprise, charity, religion, opinion, political belief or orga-
nization is hereby declared to be a nuisance and punishable as
a misdemeanor 90 if a sign, no smaller than two (2) inches by ten
(10) inches which reads "no solicitors" or words to that effect, is
within reasonable view and proximity of the door to the residence.
b). This ordinance shall in no way serve to interfere with any of
the above mentioned activities at residences not displaying a sign
as described in subsection (a), nor at residences where the occu-
pant has expressly requested or invited the visitation.
Constitutional accommodation with respect to first amendment
guarantees presents no serious difficulty in the door-to-door situa-
tion. The proposed ordinance does not prohibit an activity by it-
self; rather, a penalty is provided for those who violate the an-
nounced wishes of the individual householder. In simplistic terms,
the ordinance is nothing more than a trespass-after-warning statute.
Nor are there any major faults in the ordinance from a com-
munity interest standpoint. No organization is likely to risk public
scorn and condemnation by expressing a belief that the individual
does not have a right to deny public access to his home.
Although no reported case indicates that any similar ordinance
has undergone appellate review, the proposed ordinance is clearly
both constitutionally sound and politically realistic. Thus, the
householder can totally safeguard his domestic solitude from phys-
ical intrusion by simply placing a sign near his door."1
88 "We do not, by this reference, mean to express any opinion on the wisdom
or validity or the particular proposal . . . ." Id. at 148 & n.13.
89 Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 86 (1949).
90 See note 82, supra.
91 A common practice of door-to-door solicitors is to concentrate their activities
on homes which display "no solicitation" signs. Experience has proven that individuals
who recognize their personal weakness to the front porch sales pitch are most likely
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CONCLUSION
Generally speaking, intrusions by telephone and door-to-door
solicitations are still regarded by most courts and governmental
authorities as de minimis. However, the validity of this position
will certainly face increasingly stronger challenges in the future.
Fortunately, protective legislation is both politically and con-
stitutionally feasible. California courts will unquestionably uphold
reasonable legislation which is enacted to protect domestic security
and tranquillity from unwanted commercial solicitors. Although no
court has affirmed this author's contention, limitations can most
probably be placed upon those who wish to expound their ideas and
beliefs by telephone and home visitation. However, access to the
home for these activities cannot be totally denied by state action.
The proposed legislation herein provides a workable compromise
between constitutionally protected activities and a desirable degree
of solitude.
As society becomes more complex, the necessity for the pro-
tection of domestic solitude becomes imperative. To assume that
this quality of privacy will survive simply because man has a need
for seclusion is sheer folly. The time has arrived when legislative
action must be taken to safeguard the personal freedom which is
inherent in being let alone.
Edwin J. Gale
to "post" their door. Thus, a warning sign without legislative teeth for violators has
oftentimes been more harmful than helpful.
92 See text accompanying notes 34 & 37, supra.
